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Research Article
Negotiations and price decisions are omnipresent—
whether it is a case of selling a car or house, buying 
jewelry, or negotiating salary. Research offers two crucial 
insights for promoting first movers’ negotiation success: 
First, an ambitious first offer tends to increase a first 
 mover’s outcome by anchoring opponents to his or her 
preferred price (Loschelder, Swaab, Trötschel, & Galinsky, 
2014; Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). Second, pre-
cise offers exert a particularly strong anchoring effect 
( Janiszewski & Uy, 2008; Loschelder, Stuppi, & Trötschel, 
2013). Thus, if you are trying to sell your car, starting with 
an ambitious and precise sales price of $27,750 will bring 
you the best deal. The present research, however, raises 
the question whether precision has its limits: Would you 
benefit even more or instead suffer if you started with a 
more precise anchor of, say, $27,735 or even $27,734.63?
Research offers a seemingly straightforward answer to 
this question: The more precise a number, the stronger its 
anchoring effect. Indeed, all 49 studies on this question 
that had been published in the literature as of March 2016 
found a linear effect of anchor precision. For example, 
houses with more precise listing prices (e.g., $799,800) 
generated higher bids than houses with less precise listing 
prices ($800,000; Janiszewski & Uy, 2008; Thomas, Simon, 
& Kadiyali, 2010). Similarly, offers of €121.63 exerted a 
stronger anchoring effect than moderately precise offers 
of €125, which in turn exerted a stronger effect than round 
offers of €120 (Loschelder et al., 2013).
The current research challenges the universality of this 
linear effect of precision. We propose a too-much-precision 
effect—but only for experts. Prior research has relied 
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Abstract
Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the 
more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision 
effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources 
negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but 
inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting 
a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception 
of their competence. Statistical mediation and experimental moderation established the critical role of competence 
attributions. This research disentangles competing theoretical accounts (attribution of competence vs. scale granularity) 
and qualifies two putative truisms: that anchors affect experts and amateurs equally, and that more precise prices are 
linearly more potent anchors. The results refine current theoretical understanding of anchoring and have significant 
implications for everyday life.
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almost entirely on amateur subjects in controlled laboratory 
settings. On the surface, this is not a problem because the 
anchoring literature suggests that amateurs and experts are 
equally susceptible to anchors. For instance, expert real-
estate agents (Northcraft & Neale, 1987), people with car 
expertise (Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000), and 
 seasoned judges (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006) have 
shown anchoring effects similar to those of nonexpert sam-
ples. As Wright and Anderson (1989) put it, “The anchoring 
effect is so dominant that increasing situational familiarity 
did not result in decreased anchoring” (p. 68). In contrast, 
in the five experiments reported here, we found that high 
precision boosted an anchor’s potency for amateurs (linear 
effect), but undermined an anchor’s efficacy for experi-
enced professionals (inverted-U effect). This backfiring 
effect occurred because experts questioned the compe-
tence of negotiators who suggested very precise prices.
Two Theoretically Distinct Mechanisms
In exploring this too-much-precision effect among 
experts, the current studies disentangle two distinct 
accounts for the effect of anchor precision—scale granu-
larity and attribution of competence. The scale-granularity 
account builds on serial adjustment processes (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2001, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Accord-
ing to this view, more precise numbers, such as a $27,750 
sales price for a car, create a finer-grained mental scale 
that leads people to adjust away from the anchors in 
smaller steps, such as steps of $50 or $250. In contrast, 
rounder numbers, such as a $28,000 sales price, create a 
more coarse-grained scale that produces larger adjust-
ment steps, such as steps of $500 or $1,000. Janiszewski 
and Uy (2008) summarized the point very clearly: “X units 
of adjustment along a fine-resolution scale will cover less 
objective distance than the same number of units of 
adjustment along a coarse-resolution scale” (p. 121).
In contrast, the attribution-of-competence account 
posits that precision influences social perceptions: Com-
pared with round numbers, more precise numbers sug-
gest a more confident ( Jerez-Fernandez, Angulo, & 
Oppenheimer, 2014) and competent (Mason, Lee, Wiley, 
& Ames, 2013) counterpart. This account builds on the 
conversational maxims of quantity and quality (Grice, 
1975): People expect communicators to provide as much 
valid information as is needed, neither less nor more 
(Waenke, 2007; Zhang & Schwarz, 2012).
Disentangling the Mechanisms: 
Experts Versus Amateurs
We contrasted the negotiation performance of real-world 
negotiation experts and amateurs to test which of these 
two accounts outperforms the other. The scale-granularity 
account suggests a linear effect for both experts and ama-
teurs: The more precise a number, the finer the mental 
scale, the smaller the adjustment steps, and the more 
potent the anchor ( Janiszewski & Uy, 2008; Fig. 1a).
In contrast, the attribution-of-competence account 
suggests that when precision exceeds an appropriate 
level, it loses its anchoring impact. The finding that more 
precision is always better stems exclusively from amateur 
samples. On the basis of the attribution-of-competence 
account, one could propose that experts will attribute 
less competence to a negotiator who suggests an open-
ing price that is highly precise than to a negotiator who 
opens with a moderately precise offer (Fig. 1b). Because 
experts have likely learned that negotiators do not start 
with highly precise offers, we expected such offers 
to signal a lack of competence to experts. Hence, the 
attribution-of-competence account would predict that 
increasingly precise numbers will initially boost an 
anchor’s potency but eventually produce negative effects 
(inverted-U effect). However, this account also predicts 
that increasing precision even at high levels will yield 
linear benefits if plausible explanations accompany these 
precise offers; compelling explanations will prevent 
experts from denigrating the first movers’ competence. 
To test this mechanism, we both measured and manipu-
lated attributions of competence.
Experiment 1: Expertise Moderates  
the Effects of Anchor Precision in  
Real-Estate Negotiations
In Experiment 1, we manipulated first offers in a real-
estate negotiation to be increasingly precise and con-
trasted experts’ and amateurs’ behavior.
Method
Subjects and design. We recruited 453 subjects (mean 
age = 38.51 years, SD = 14.92; 225 male, 157 female, 71 with 
unreported gender), who were assigned to a 2 (expertise: 
experts vs. amateurs) × 7 (precision: 2–8 digits) between-
subjects design. The amateur sample consisted of 230 indi-
viduals who lacked professional negotiation experience and 
worked in professions outside of real estate. They were 
recruited via social- networking platforms or approached by 
research assistants in a local shopping mall. The expert sam-
ple consisted of 223 real-estate agents who averaged 17.18 
years of professional experience (SD = 10.98, Mdn = 16) 
and who negotiated the sale of 19.67 houses per annum 
on average (SD = 28.18, Mdn = 10). These real-estate 
agents were either identified via the German Association 
of Real Estate Agents (Immobilienverband Deutschland) 
and contacted via e-mail or approached by research 
assistants in their respective agencies.
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We planned for data collection to last a total of 10 
weeks, provided that we succeeded in recruiting a mini-
mum of 20 amateurs and 20 experts per condition in this 
time frame (see the recommendations for good research 
practice by Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Once 
the criterion was met, the research assistants collected data 
from as many additional subjects as possible until the 10 
weeks were over, in order to increase the statistical power 
of the experiment. Nineteen subjects correctly suspected 
that the purpose of the experiment was to examine anchor-
ing effects and were thus excluded from analyses. This 
criterion was adopted prior to data collection.
Procedure and manipulations. The experts and 
amateurs who were recruited online were invited with a 
standardized e-mail and participated in the experiment 
via the online survey tool SoSci Survey; those who were 
approached in person completed a written questionnaire 
given to them by the research assistant. The content of 
the experimental materials in the two mediums was iden-
tical. Subjects received a detailed real-estate listing with 
pictures, floor plans, and other relevant information (e.g., 
lot size, location, amenities; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; see 
the Supplemental Material available online for details).
The precision of the listing price was manipulated 
between subjects. In the baseline condition, subjects 
received a “round” anchor with only two precise digits 
(i.e., €980,000). In the conditions with increasing precision 
(3–8 digits), we followed previous research in giving half 
the subjects an anchor slightly above and the other half an 
anchor slightly below the baseline value1 (Janiszewski 
& Uy, 2008; Mason et al., 2013). The listing price was 
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Fig. 1. Competing theoretical accounts’ predictions of the effect of anchor precision in negotiation. According to the scale-granularity account 
(a), increasing anchor precision will have a linear effect irrespective of expertise: Both experts and amateurs will make smaller adjustment steps 
in response to increasingly precise anchors. According to the attribution-of-competence account (b), increasing anchor precision will have a linear 
effect for negotiators with relatively little expertise but an inverted-U effect for negotiators with considerable expertise: Too much precision reduces 
the competence that experts attribute to the first mover, unless a rationale that boosts their perception of the first mover’s competence is present. 
Note that the process depicted for highly precise anchors in (b) is not necessarily sequential or explicit. Recipients of an offer may process the 
anchor’s precision and the existence of a plausible rationale in parallel or automatically.
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€979,000 or €981,000 in the three-digits condition, 
€978,800 or €981,200 in the four-digits condition, €978,790 
or €981,210 in the five-digits condition, €978,782 or 
€981,218 in the six-digits condition, €978,781.70 or 
€981,218.30 in the seven-digits condition, and €978,781.63 
or €981,218.37 in the eight-digits condition.
Dependent measures and potential mediators. We 
asked subjects to make a counteroffer to the seller (Mason 
et al., 2013) and to state the highest price that they were 
willing to pay for the house (Thomas et al., 2010).
To cast light on the underlying mechanisms, we mea-
sured two competing mediators. To test the scale-granularity 
account, we followed prior research (Janiszewski & Uy, 
2008; Mason et al., 2013) in coding the precision of subjects’ 
responses (specifically, their counteroffers)—that is, we 
counted the number of digits that did not equal zero. If more 
precise anchors lead to more fine-grained adjustment scales, 
they should also encourage subjects to give more precise 
responses, and round anchors should encourage round 
responses. To test the attribution-of-competence account, we 
asked subjects to rate the seller’s negotiation competence: 
“The seller knows the property’s adequate value,” “The seller 
made a competent offer,” “The seller proposed a fair price,” 
“The seller spent considerable energy researching the prop-
erty’s value” (α = .70; see Mason et al., 2013). These four 
items were accompanied by 7-point rating scales ranging 
from 1, do not agree, to 7, strongly agree. Composite 
scores were calculated by averaging the four ratings.
Results2
Willingness to pay. We conducted linear and quadratic 
regression analyses on the maximum prices subjects 
were willing to pay. First, the linear model tested whether 
the anchoring effect increased with the precision of the 
anchor (yi = a1 + b1 * xi, where yi = estimated willingness 
to pay, or WTP, and xi = anchor precision). The model 
also tested whether experts and amateurs reacted differ-
ently to increasing precision. We regressed subjects’ 
WTP on a contrast-coded predictor for expertise (−1 = 
amateur, 1 = expert), a linear predictor for anchor preci-
sion (2–8 digits), and their interaction term (i.e., Expertise 
× Precision). As predicted, the overall regression model 
was significant, F(3, 401) = 5.55, p = .001, as was the 
regression coefficient for the Expertise × Precision inter-
action, b = −16.00, t(401) = 4.04, p < .001. These results 
suggested that the linear effects of anchor precision dif-
fered between experts and amateurs.
Second, the quadratic model tested the curvilinear, 
inverted-U effect (yi = a1 + b1 * xi – b2 * xi
2; see Grant, 
2013; Grant & Schwartz, 2011). We regressed subjects’ 
WTP on the three predictors from the linear analyses plus 
a quadratic predictor for anchor precision (ranging from 
4 to 64) and the interaction term of expertise and qua-
dratic precision (i.e., Expertise × Precision2). As expected, 
this overall model was also significant, F(5, 399) = 4.53, 
p = .001. In addition, the Expertise × Precision2 term was 
marginally significant, b = −5.44, t(399) = −1.84, p = .067 
(all other effects, ps > .208). These results suggested that 
the quadratic effects of anchor precision also differed 
between experts and amateurs.
To examine the interactions more closely, we estimated 
separate effects for experts and amateurs in the context of 
the overall model by dummy coding experts as the refer-
ence category (0 = expert, 1 = amateur) in one analysis 
and amateurs as the reference category (1 = expert, 0 = 
amateur) in another. Results from these regression analy-
ses are summarized in Table 1. For amateurs, the data fit 
a linear regression model; more precise anchors were 
associated linearly with higher WTP (Fig. 2). For experts, 
however, the data fit a quadratic, inverted-U model. More 
precise anchors led to higher WTP, but only up to a point, 
after which the benefit of precision decreased and even-
tually turned into a disadvantage (Fig. 2).
Counteroffers. The counteroffer data corroborated the 
WTP pattern, fitting a linear regression model for ama-
teurs and a quadratic model for experts (see Fig. 2 and 
the Supplemental Material).
Table 1. The Impact of Anchor Precision on Willingness to Pay in Experiment 1
Predictor
Amateurs Experts
Linear model Quadratic model Linear model Quadratic model
Precision 29.53*** (7.31) 26.19 (40.41) –2.47 (7.37) 101.30* (43.68)
Precision2 — 0.34 (3.99) — –10.55** (4.38)
Intercept 543.22 (38.94) 550.31 (92.79) 692.05 (38.36) 481.03 (95.53)
 F F(1, 214) = 13.13*** F(2, 213) = 6.54** F(1, 187) = 0.16 F(2, 186) = 4.22*
Note: The table reports unstandardized regression weights, with standard errors in parentheses. The estimates 
are based on experts’ and amateurs’ data and were obtained for each group by dummy coding the other 
group as the reference category.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Mediation analyses. We conducted statistical media-
tion analyses using a bootstrapping procedure (with 
5,000 iterations) that simultaneously tested for mediating 
roles of scale granularity and attributed competence 
(Hayes, 2013). To contrast the competing theoretical 
accounts, we entered as multiple mediators the level of 
precision in subjects’ counteroffers ( Janiszewski & Uy, 
2008) and the degree of competence subjects attributed 
to the seller (Mason et al., 2013). For amateurs, the linear 
effect of anchor precision on WTP was mediated by 
attributed negotiation competence, b = 14.04, SE = 4.48, 
bias-corrected (BC) 95% confidence interval (CI) = [6.01, 
23.62], whereas the indirect effect through counteroffer 
precision (i.e., scale granularity) was not significant, b = 
−0.19, SE = 0.78, BC 95% CI = [−2.86, 0.76] (i.e., zero was 
included in this CI). For experts, the quadratic, inverted-
U effect of anchor precision was mediated by attributed 
competence, b = −5.08, SE = 2.17, BC 95% CI = [−9.64, 
−1.28], but not by scale granularity, b = −0.05, SE = 0.32, 
BC 95% CI = [−1.23, 0.34]. These mediation analyses indi-
cate that attributed competence, but not scale granularity, 
is the psychological mechanism underlying the linear 
and curvilinear effects of anchor precision among nego-
tiation amateurs and experts, respectively.
Discussion
The data from this experiment provide evidence that pre-
cise prices have differential anchoring effects on experts 
and amateurs. For amateurs, WTP and counteroffers 
increased linearly with precision of the first offer. For 
experts, WTP and counteroffers increased with precision 
only up to a point, after which greater precision back-
fired. The moderation by expertise and the results of our 
mediation analyses are consistent with the attribution-of-
competence account.
Experiment 2: Expertise Moderates 
the Effects of Anchor Precision in 
Negotiations for Diamonds
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 with experts and 
amateurs in a jewelry setting.
Method
Subjects and design. We recruited 432 subjects (mean 
age = 34.78 years, SD = 12.99; 126 male, 198 female, 108 
with unreported gender), who were assigned to a 2 
(expertise: experts vs. amateurs) × 7 (precision: 2–8 
 digits) between-subjects design. The amateur sample 
consisted of 225 individuals who had no professional 
negotiation experience and worked in a variety of pro-
fessions unrelated to jewelry. They were recruited either 
online or in a local shopping mall. The expert sample 
consisted of 207 goldsmiths and jewelers who averaged 
20.34 years of professional experience (SD = 11.40, Mdn = 
20) and negotiated the sale of 34.65 pieces of jewelry per 
week on average (SD = 81.05, Mdn = 20). The experts 
were either identified online and contacted with a stan-
dardized e-mail or approached by research assistants in 
their respective jewelry store.
Again, we recruited a minimum of 20 amateurs and 20 
experts per condition and terminated data collection after 
a predetermined period of 10 weeks. Fourteen subjects 
correctly suspected that the study’s purpose was to exam-
ine anchoring effects and were thus excluded from 
analyses.
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Fig. 2. Results from Experiment 1: mean willingness to pay (WTP) and mean counteroffer as a function of anchor precision (2–8 digits), sepa-
rately for experts and amateurs. Also shown are the best-fitting regression lines. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
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Procedure and manipulations. The experts and ama-
teurs who were recruited online participated via the online 
survey tool SoSci Survey, and those who were approached 
in person filled out a written questionnaire that the research 
assistant gave them. Subjects received pictures and a 
description of an 18-carat white-gold necklace with 817 
brilliant-cut diamonds (see the Supplemental Material for 
details). In the description, we manipulated only the preci-
sion of the listed price. In the baseline condition, this 
anchor was €180,000. In the conditions with increasing pre-
cision (3–8 digits), as in Experiment 1, half the anchors 
were slightly above and half slightly below the baseline 
value. The anchor was €178,000 or €182,000 in the three-
digits condition, €178,500 or €181,500 in the four-digits 
condition, €178,250 or €181,750 in the five-digits condi-
tion, €178,264 or €181,736 in the six-digits condition, 
€178,263.70 or €181,736.30 in the seven-digits condition, 
and €178,263.62 or €181,736.38 in the eight-digits 
condition.
Dependent measures and potential mediators. We 
assessed subjects’ WTP and counteroffers as dependent 
measures, and we tested the granularity of counteroffers 
and the competence attributed to the seller (α = .62) as 
potential mediators. (See Experiment 1 for a description 
of the measures.)
Results2
Willingness to pay. We conducted the same linear and 
quadratic regression analyses on WTP as in Experiment 
1. As predicted, the overall linear regression model was 
significant, F(3, 400) = 3.27, p = .021, though the Exper-
tise × Precision interaction was not, b = −1.75, t(400) = 
−1.50, p = .135. The overall quadratic regression model 
was also significant, F(5, 398) = 3.45, p = .005. In addi-
tion, the Expertise × Precision2 interaction was margin-
ally significant, b = −1.17, t(398) = −1.74, p = .083.
As in Experiment 1, we next estimated separate effects 
for experts and amateurs in the context of the overall 
model by dummy coding experts as the reference cate-
gory (0 = expert, 1 = amateur) in one analysis and ama-
teurs as the reference category (1 = expert, 0 = amateur) 
in another. Results from these regression analyses are 
summarized in Table 2. For amateurs, the data fit a linear 
regression model. For experts, however, the data again fit 
only a quadratic, inverted-U model (Fig. 3; see the Sup-
plemental Material for additional analyses).
Counteroffers. The counteroffer data corroborated the 
WTP pattern, fitting a linear regression model for ama-
teurs and a quadratic model for experts (see Fig. 3 and 
the Supplemental Material).
Mediation analyses. We conducted multiple media-
tion analyses as in Experiment 1. The linear effect for 
amateurs and the quadratic effect for experts were both 
mediated by the negotiation competence that subjects 
attributed to the seller—amateurs: b = 1.25, SE = 0.47, BC 
95% CI = [0.49, 2.42]; experts: b = −1.10, SE = 0.49, BC 
95% CI = [−2.14, −0.22]. The indirect effects through 
counteroffer granularity were not significant—amateurs: 
b = −0.27, SE = 0.57, BC 95% CI = [−1.34, 0.98]; experts: 
b = −0.06, SE = 0.30, BC 95% CI = [−0.68, 0.51].
Discussion
The first two experiments established a linear effect of 
increasing anchor precision for amateurs but a quadratic, 
inverted-U effect for experts. This expert-amateur dispar-
ity was statistically accounted for by the attribution-of-
competence and not the scale-granularity account.
Experiment 3: Is the Too-Much-
Precision Effect Merely a Penny Effect?
Experiment 3 tested whether excessive precision back-
fired for experts only because the highly precise anchors 
featured cents. Does the too-much-precision effect gen-
eralize to precise offers that do not involve pennies?
Table 2. The Impact of Anchor Precision on Willingness to Pay in Experiment 2
Predictor
Amateurs Experts
Linear model Quadratic model Linear model Quadratic model
Precision 3.61** (1.64) 6.06 (9.47) 0.12 (1.66) 26.39** (9.90)
Precision2 — –0.25 (0.94) — –2.58** (0.96)
Intercept 109.59 (8.58) 104.46 (19.19) 116.22 (8.89) 59.95 (22.70)
 F F(1, 210) = 6.15** F(2, 209) = 3.11* F(1, 190) = 0.04 F(2, 189) = 2.98*
Note: The table reports unstandardized regression weights, with standard errors in parentheses. The 
estimates are based on experts’ and amateurs’ data and were obtained for each group by dummy coding 
the other group as the reference category.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Method
Subjects and design. We recruited an expert sample 
of 150 real-estate agents (mean age = 50.29 years, SD = 
13.36; 65 male, 15 female, 70 with unreported gender), 
who were randomly assigned to one of three conditions 
(precision: low vs. moderate vs. high). The recruited 
agents averaged 20.85 years of professional work experi-
ence in real estate (SD = 12.17, Mdn = 20), and they 
negotiated the sale of 27.93 real-estate properties per 
annum on average (SD = 42.05, Mdn = 15). We identified 
these experts countrywide via the German Association of 
Real Estate Agents (Immobilienverband Deutschland) 
and invited them to participate in this experiment with a 
standardized e-mail. Data were collected via the online 
survey tool SoSci Survey for a predetermined period of 
7 days. We used the same a priori exclusion rule as in 
Experiments 1 and 2; 8 experts correctly suspected that 
the study’s purpose was to examine anchoring effects 
and were thus excluded from analyses.
Procedure and manipulations. Subjects were asked 
to imagine buying a chemical plant that was estimated 
to be worth between €17 million and €25 million 
(Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; see the Supplemental 
Material for details). As a between-subjects factor, we 
manipulated the precision of the plant’s sale price. In 
the low-precision condition, the seller asked for 
€26,000,000. In the moderate- precision condition, the 
seller asked for €25,750,000, and in the high-precision 
condition, the seller asked for €25,748,637.
Dependent measures and potential mediators. We 
assessed subjects’ WTP and counteroffers as dependent 
measures, and we tested the granularity of counteroffers 
and the competence attributed to the seller (α = .79) as 
potential mediators. (See Experiment 1 for a description 
of the measures.)
Results2
Willingness to pay. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the 
experts’ WTP followed an inverted-U pattern (Fig. 4). 
Compared with agents in the low-precision condition 
(M = €19.64 million, SD = 2.87), agents in the moderate-
precision condition were willing to pay significantly more 
for the plant (M = €21.95 million, SD = 3.87), t(80) = 
2.65, p = .010, d = 0.68. As expected, however, the maxi-
mum acceptable price for agents in the high-precision 
condition (M = €19.85 million, SD = 2.74) was lower than 
that for agents in the moderate-precision condition, t(80) = 
−2.43, p = .017, d = 0.63, and WTP did not differ between 
the high-precision and low-precision conditions, t(80) = 
0.268, p = .789. The quadratic contrast was significant, 
b = 1.80, SE = 0.63, p = .005, 95% CI = [0.55, 3.05], whereas 
the linear contrast was not, b = −0.15, SE = 0.57, p = .789, 
95% CI = [−0.99, 1.29]. The overall analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) showed a main effect of precision, F(2, 80) = 
4.15, p = .019, ηp2 = .09.
Counteroffers. The pattern for the experts’ counterof-
fers paralleled the pattern for WTP. Moderately precise 
prices were more potent anchors (M = €19.11 million, 
SD = 4.54) than were nonprecise prices (M = €16.93 mil-
lion, SD = 3.39), t(139) = 2.89, p = .005, d = 0.54, and 
highly precise prices (M = €17.44 million, SD = 2.98), 
t(139) = 2.18, p = .031, d = 0.43. Counteroffers in the low- 
and high-precision conditions did not differ, t(139) = 
0.69, p = .494. The quadratic contrast was significant, b = 
1.57, SE = 0.54, p = .004, 95% CI = [0.50, 2.64], whereas 
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the linear contrast was not, b = 0.36, SE = 0.53, p = .494, 
95% CI = [−0.68, 1.41]. The overall ANOVA was signifi-
cant, F(2, 139) = 4.48, p = .013, ηp2 = .06.
Mediation analyses. We conducted a multiple media-
tion analysis as in Experiments 1 and 2. The quadratic 
effect for experts’ WTP was mediated by the negotiation 
competence attributed to the seller, b = 0.20, SE = 0.15, 
BC 95% CI = [0.025, 0.60], whereas the indirect effect 
through counteroffer granularity was not significant, b = 
0.020, SE = 0.11, BC 95% CI = [−0.20, 0.25].
Discussion
Experiment 3 established that the backfiring effect of too 
much precision emerges even when the level of preci-
sion does not involve pennies.
Experiment 4: Convincing Car-Sales 
Experts With a Rationale for Precision
We had three goals in Experiment 4: First, we hoped to 
replicate the expert-amateur disparity in a third domain—
the automotive sector. Second, we wanted to address an 
endogeneity concern: The experts and novices in Experi-
ments 1 through 3 might have differed not only in nego-
tiation experience but also in general knowledge about 
real estate and jewelry. In Experiment 4, we therefore 
contrasted salespeople with mechanics; they differ in 
negotiation experience but not in car expertise. Third, we 
sought to shed causal light on the underlying mecha-
nisms of anchoring effects by experimentally manipulat-
ing attributed competence (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005); in one condition, highly precise offers were accom-
panied by a rationale intended to boost subjects’ percep-
tion of the seller’s competence (a competence-boosting 
rationale). We expected that this manipulation would 
prevent highly precise prices from backfiring among 
experts. That is, anchoring effects should be equal for 
amateurs and experts when highly precise prices are 
accompanied by competence-boosting rationales.
Method
Subjects and design. We recruited 179 automotive 
professionals at their respective garages and dealerships. 
Subjects were assigned to a 2 (expertise: mechanics vs. 
salespeople) × 4 (condition: low precision vs. moderate 
precision vs. high precision vs. high precision plus ratio-
nale) between-subjects design. Research assistants con-
tacted car dealerships by telephone to arrange an 
appointment or directly approached salespeople and 
mechanics on site. Eighty-five of the recruited subjects 
were mechanics, and 94 were salespeople (mean age = 
35.41 years, SD = 11.11; 167 male, 12 female). As 
expected, the mechanics negotiated significantly fewer 
car sales per year (M = 5.13, SD = 14.94, Mdn = 1) compared 
with the salespeople (M = 133.50, SD = 69.79, Mdn = 
125), t(121) = 12.95, p < .001, d = 2.54, but the two groups 
did not differ markedly in work experience in the 
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automotive sector (mechanics: M = 12.74 years; salespeo-
ple: M = 15.38 years), t(158) = 1.60, p = .112, d = 0.25.
We recruited a minimum of 20 experts and 20 ama-
teurs per condition and terminated data collection after a 
predetermined period of 10 weeks. Sixteen subjects sus-
pected correctly that the purpose of this experiment was 
to examine anchoring effects and were thus excluded 
from the analyses.
Procedure. Subjects received a detailed description of a 
black 2013 Peugeot 508 SW (Business Line; 4.80 L per 
100 km, or 56.4 miles per gallon; 140-horsepower engine). 
At the time of data collection, the car was a year old and 
had run 22,000 km (approximately 13,700 miles; see the 
Supplemental Material for details). Subjects were told to 
carefully familiarize themselves with the car, as they 
would later negotiate the sale price with the car’s present 
owner.
We manipulated the precision of the seller’s first offer. 
In the low-precision condition, the first offer was €28,000. 
In the conditions with increased precision, half the anchors 
were above and half were below the baseline value; that 
is, the first offer was €27,830 or €28,170 in the moderate-
precision condition and €27,837.63 or €28,162.37 in the 
high-precision condition.
In the high-precision-plus-rationale condition, the 
seller provided a rationale for the highly precise anchor. 
The seller stated, “I have corrected an expert’s appraisal 
of the car’s value for the following factors: (1) inspections 
by licensed dealers, (2) small scratch on mudguard, and 
(3) long-distance use only.” This rationale manipulation 
allowed us to test the proposed causal effect of attributed 
competence through the moderation-of-process para-
digm (Spencer et al., 2005). If attributed negotiation com-
petence indeed mediates the effect of anchor precision, 
then experimentally boosting perceptions of the seller’s 
competence with a compelling rationale should prevent 
highly precise prices from having a backfiring effect 
among experts. Unlike the classic approach of measuring 
a mediator (Baron & Kenny, 1986), the moderation-of-
process design involves manipulating the mediator 
experimentally. If the proposed mediator is truly a media-
tor, it will have a moderation effect on the outcome vari-
able when it is manipulated. The experimental component 
of this approach allows for causal inferences about a pro-
posed process. It is thus recommended, and considered 
by many researchers to be the gold standard, to combine 
measurement and moderation approaches when trying 
to gather comprehensive evidence for a psychological 
process (Spencer et al., 2005; see Sigall & Mills, 1998).
Dependent measures and potential mediators. We 
assessed subjects’ WTP and counteroffers as dependent 
measures, and we tested the granularity of their counter-
offers and the competence they attributed to the seller 
(α = .83) as competing mediators. (See Experiment 1 for 
a description of the measures.)
Results2
Manipulation check. To check whether the rationale 
manipulation was successful, we analyzed how much 
competence subjects attributed to the seller. As expected, 
among subjects who received highly precise first offers, 
those who were given a rationale ascribed more compe-
tence to the seller (M = 4.07, SD = 1.15) than did those 
who were not given a rationale (M = 3.25, SD = 1.18), 
t(81) = 3.17, p = .002.
Willingness to pay. Given that the mechanics were 
negotiation amateurs, they were expected to show a lin-
ear effect of increasing anchor precision. Indeed, the 
amount that the mechanics were willing to pay was low-
est in the low-precision condition (M = €21,875, SD = 
3,325), increased in the moderate-precision condition 
(M = €23,285, SD = 2,889) and the high-precision condi-
tion (M = €23,586, SD = 2,522), and was highest in the 
high-precision-plus-rationale condition (M = €24,222, SD = 
3,649; see Fig. 5). The linear contrast was significant, b = 
1.64, SE = 0.70, p = .021, 95% CI = [0.25, 3.03]; as expected, 
the quadratic contrast was not, b = −0.39, SE = 0.68, p = 
.573, 95% CI = [−1.75, 0.98].
Given that the salespeople were negotiation experts, 
their WTP was expected to exhibit the same inverted-U 
effect we found for experts in Experiments 1 through 3. 
Indeed, salespeople in the moderate-precision condition 
(M = €23,931, SD = 2,146) tended to be willing to pay 
higher prices compared with salespeople in the low- 
precision condition (M = €22,447, SD = 3,320), t(76) = 
1.61, p = .111, d = 0.53. However, salespeople’s WTP was 
significantly lower in the high-precision condition (M = 
€20,929, SD = 3,377) than in the moderate-precision con-
dition, t(76) = 3.35, p < .001, d = 1.06, and their WTP was 
even marginally lower in the high-precision condition 
than in the low-precision condition, t(76) = 1.69, p = .095, 
d = 0.45 (see Fig. 5). The quadratic contrast for these three 
conditions was significant, b = 1.83, SE = 0.69, p = .010, 
95% CI = [0.46, 3.21]; as expected, the linear contrast was 
not, b = −1.07, SE = 0.68, p = .118, 95% CI = [−0.28, 2.43].
The provision of a rationale counteracted the effect of 
highly precise anchors, as predicted: Salespeople given a 
highly precise first offer were willing to pay more if they 
also received a rationale (M = €23,350, SD = 2,251) than if 
they did not, t(76) = 2.77, p = .007, d = 0.84, and WTP did 
not differ between the high-precision-plus-rationale and 
moderate-precision conditions, t(76) = 0.65, p = .519 
(see Fig. 5). For the salespeople, a cubic contrast for all 
four conditions was significant, b = 2.20, SE = 0.64, 
p = .001, 95% CI = [0.95, 3.48]; the linear and quadratic 
contrasts were not significant, ps > .463. An overall 2 
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(expertise) × 4 (condition) ANOVA showed a main effect 
of condition, F(3, 152) = 3.42, p = .019, ηp2 = .06, that was 
qualified by a two-way interaction, F(3, 152) = 2.87, p = 
.038, ηp2 = .05.
Counteroffers. The counteroffer data corroborated the 
WTP patterns for experts and amateurs (see the Supple-
mental Material).
Mediation analyses. We conducted multiple media-
tion analyses analogous to those in the previous experi-
ments (see Experiment 1). The linear effect for the 
mechanics and the quadratic effect for the salespeople 
were both mediated by attributed negotiation compe-
tence—mechanics: b = 0.34, SE = 0.16, BC 95% CI = [0.09, 
0.74]; salespeople: b = −0.28, SE = 0.16, BC 95% CI = 
[−0.68, −0.04]. The indirect effects through counteroffer 
granularity were not significant—mechanics: b = 0.03, 
SE = 0.09, BC 95% CI = [−0.15, 0.24]; salespeople: b = 
−0.09, SE = 0.09, BC 95% CI = [−0.38, 0.013].
Discussion
Experiment 4 replicated the linear effect of precision 
among amateurs and the inverted-U effect of precision 
among experts. Attributions of competence accounted 
for both effects. Experiment 4 was a particularly conser-
vative test of the expertise factor because we recruited 
mechanics and salespeople, who differed in negotiation 
expertise but not in car expertise. In addition, we tested 
the causality of the proposed underlying mechanism by 
manipulating the mediator, attributions of competence. 
Providing a compelling rationale for high precision 
boosted the competence ascribed to the seller and 
increased the potency of highly precise prices, even 
among expert negotiators.
Experiment 5: Convincing Human-
Resources Experts With a Rationale for 
Precision
In Experiment 5, we again both measured and manipu-
lated attributions of competence. This time, we studied 
human-resources experts and fully crossed the precision 
and rationale manipulations.
Method
Subjects and design. We recruited an expert sample of 
171 recruitment professionals (mean age = 42.96 years, 
SD = 12.62; 83 male, 63 female, 25 with unreported gen-
der). These experts were randomly assigned to a 3 (preci-
sion: low vs. moderate vs. high) × 2 (rationale: no rationale 
vs. rationale) between-subjects design. Subjects averaged 
17.22 years of work experience in human resources (SD = 
12.13, Mdn = 15) and negotiated 40.37 job contracts per 
annum on average (SD = 84.95, Mdn = 17.5). They were 
identified and contacted via the Federal Association of 
Human Resources Managers (Bundesverband der Person-
almanager) and via the German Employment Agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit).
Again, we recruited a minimum of 20 subjects per con-
dition and terminated data collection after a predetermined 
period of 10 weeks. Eight subjects suspected correctly that 
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the purpose of this study was to examine anchoring effects 
and were thus excluded from the analyses.
Procedure. The experts participated via the online sur-
vey tool SoSci Survey. They were asked to imagine nego-
tiating starting salary with a promising job candidate 
(adapted from Neale, 1997; see also Loschelder, Trötschel, 
Swaab, Friese, & Galinsky, 2016). Negotiations started 
with an opening proposal from the candidate (see the 
Supplemental Material for details).
We manipulated the precision of the candidate’s open-
ing proposal (precision: low vs. moderate vs. high). In the 
low-precision condition, the candidate asked for a salary 
of €48,000. In the conditions with increased precision, 
half the anchors were above and half were below that 
value; specifically, the anchors were €47,850 and €48,150 
in the moderate-precision condition and €47,842.87 and 
€48,157.13 in the high-precision condition.
In each precision condition, approximately half of the 
subjects were given a rationale for the candidate’s open-
ing proposal. He said, “Preparing for this meeting, I have 
conducted a salary analysis and calculated an average for 
this field and position. I adjusted this mean value for my 
(1) final grade, (2) auxiliary qualifications, and (3) num-
ber of internships.” No rationale was included in the 
materials that the other subjects received.
Dependent measures and potential mediators. We 
assessed the recruiters’ WTP and counteroffers as depen-
dent measures, and we tested the granularity of their 
counteroffers and the competence they attributed to the 
job candidate (α = .83) as competing mediators. (See 
Experiment 1 for a description of the measures.)
Results2
Manipulation check. To check whether the rationale 
manipulation was successful, we analyzed how much 
competence subjects attributed to the candidate. As 
expected, among recruiters in the high-precision condi-
tion, those who were given a rationale attributed signifi-
cantly more competence to the candidate (M = 3.82, 
SD = 1.28) than did those who were not given a rationale 
(M = 2.87, SD = 1.13), t(55) = 2.99, p = .004. In addition, 
attributions of competence did not differ between the 
high-precision-plus-rationale condition and the moderate- 
precision condition (M = 3.67, SD = 1.11), t(52) = 0.45, 
p = .658.
Willingness to pay. As expected, among recruiters 
who were not given a rationale, WTP followed an 
inverted-U pattern (see Fig. 6). The recruiters in the low-
precision condition (M = €41,700, SD = 2,545) were will-
ing to pay significantly lower salaries than were those in 
the moderate-precision condition (M = €43,393, SD = 
2,562), t(81) = 2.30, p = .024, d = 0.87. Also, WTP was 
lower for recruiters in the high-precision condition (M = 
€42,016, SD = 2,865) than for those in the moderate- 
precision condition, t(81) = 1.98, p = .052, d = 0.51. WTP 
did not differ between the high-precision condition and 
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the low-precision condition, t(81) = 0.44, p = .661. The 
quadratic contrast was significant, b = 1.25, SE = 0.51, p = 
.015, 95% CI = [0.25, 2.26]; the linear contrast was not, 
b = 0.22, SE = 0.51, p = .661, 95% CI = [−0.79, 1.24].
When the candidate provided a rationale, the expert 
recruiters’ WTP was lowest in the low-precision condition 
(M = €42,407, SD = 1,886), higher in the moderate- 
precision condition (M = €42,600, SD = 2,578), and high-
est in the high-precision condition (M = €43,325, SD = 
2,230; see Fig. 6). The linear contrast revealed a nonsig-
nificant trend, b = 0.65, SE = 0.44, p = .140, 95% CI = 
[−0.22, 1.53], the quadratic contrast was clearly not signifi-
cant, b = 0.22, SE = 0.44, p = .626, 95% CI = [−0.67, 1.10].
The data support the attribution-of-competence account 
in that the provision of a rationale counteracted the det-
rimental anchoring effect of highly precise anchors. 
Recruiters in the high-precision condition were willing to 
pay a marginally higher salary when the candidate pro-
vided a rationale than when he did not, t(55) = 1.90, p = 
.063, d = 0.51 (Fig. 6). An overall 3 (precision) × 2 (ratio-
nale) ANOVA showed a marginally significant two-way 
interaction, F(2, 156) = 2.59, p = .079, ηp2 = .03 (all other 
Fs < 1.96, ps > .14).
Counteroffers. The counteroffer data corroborated the 
WTP patterns (see the Supplemental Material).
Mediation analyses. We contrasted the two compet-
ing theoretical accounts using a multiple mediation anal-
ysis analogous to the one for Experiment 1. The quadratic 
effect in the no-rationale condition was mediated by the 
negotiation competence that the experts attributed to the 
candidate, b = 0.14, SE = 0.09, BC 95% CI = [0.042, 0.37], 
whereas the indirect effect through counteroffer granular-
ity was not significant, b = 0.008, SE = 0.03, BC 95% CI = 
[−0.034, 0.098].
Discussion
Experiment 5 provides causal support for the attribution-
of-competence account. A competence-boosting ratio-
nale prevented the backlash otherwise observed among 
experts when first offers were overly precise. This effect 
of attributed competence was also confirmed through 
statistical mediation analyses including measured compe-
tence ratings.
Internal Meta-Analyses
To provide a comprehensive evaluation of the hypothesis 
that the effect of anchor precision is linear for amateurs 
but quadratic for experts, we conducted two internal 
random- effects meta-analyses based on all five experi-
ments. One meta-analysis focused on linear effects, and 
the other focused on quadratic effects. To test for the 
focal moderation effect of subjects’ negotiation expertise, 
we employed Q tests, which are analogous to one-way 
ANOVAs in primary research (see the Supplemental 
Material for details on this internal meta-analysis).
The meta-analysis for a linear effect of anchor preci-
sion produced an overall nonsignificant mean effect size, 
r = .075, 95% CI = [−.020, .170], z = 1.55, p = .122. How-
ever, more than half of the observed variance reflected 
true differences in effect size, I2 = 56.99, Q(7) = 16.28, 
p = .023. Hence, we included subjects’ negotiation exper-
tise in the next step of the analysis, which showed a 
highly significant difference between amateurs and 
experts, Q(1) = 13.21, p < .001. Whereas there was a 
highly significant linear effect for amateurs, as expected, 
r = .209, 95% CI = [.122, .293], z = 4.65, p < .001, the linear 
effect was nonsignificant for experts, r = −.011, 95% CI = 
[−.092, .069], z = −0.273, p = .785.
The meta-analysis for a quadratic effect of anchor pre-
cision produced a small overall mean effect size, r = .153, 
95% CI = [.057, .245], z = 3.12, p = .002. Again, more than 
half of the observed variance reflected true differences in 
effect size, I2 = 57.71, Q(7) = 16.55, p = .021. Including 
subjects’ expertise in the next step of the analysis revealed 
a highly significant difference between amateurs and 
experts, Q(1) = 14.01, p < .001. Whereas there was a 
highly significant quadratic effect of anchor precision for 
experts, as expected, r = .230, 95% CI = [.152, .305], z = 
5.67, p < .001, the quadratic effect was nonsignificant for 
amateurs, r = .003, 95% CI = [−.086, .093], z = 0.08, p = 
.940. Together, these analyses further corroborate that the 
effect of anchor precision is moderated by expertise; the 
effect is linear for amateurs but quadratic for experts.
General Discussion
Five experiments across four domains found differential 
effects of anchor precision for negotiation amateurs and 
experts. Whereas amateurs showed a consistent linear 
effect, too much precision backfired among experts. We 
contrasted competing predictions from two theoretical 
accounts—attribution-of-competence and scale-granularity 
(Fig. 1): Statistical mediation analyses (Experiments 1–5) 
and experimental tests of moderation by competence-
boosting rationales (Experiments 4 and 5) suggested that 
the competence attributed to the first mover accounted 
for amateurs’ linear and experts’ quadratic effects.
The findings contribute to psychological science in 
several ways. Past research has found that anchor extrem-
ity affects amateurs and experts equally. Here, we have 
shown for the first time that anchor precision can have 
markedly different effects for amateurs and experts. In 
addition, the results obtained with our rationale manipu-
lation offer two important contributions. First, they pro-
vide causal evidence for the mediating role of competence 
attribution. Second, they challenge research showing that 
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rationales have a detrimental effect: Maaravi, Ganzach, 
and Pazy (2011) found that rationales justifying the 
extremity of a first offer can produce particularly aggres-
sive counteroffers. In contrast, our findings show that 
rationales can help signal competence when offers are 
highly precise. Future research may examine whether the 
provision of any rationale—even an unconvincing, “pla-
cebic” argument—will also elevate the perceived compe-
tence of first movers and reduce the too-much-precision 
effect (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978).
The present findings also contribute to psychological 
science more broadly by demonstrating the value of 
expanding the subject pool to negotiation experts: Our 
process analyses suggested that identical experimental 
manipulations caused psychologically distinct reactions in 
individuals with different levels of expertise. Hence, our 
findings suggest the need for caution in relying on highly 
homogeneous subject samples for theory testing. Our 
findings demonstrate how novel insights can emerge from 
taking advantage of heterogeneous samples (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). That is, a psychological 
effect and its mechanism may differ depending on a vari-
ety of individual characteristics, including experience and 
cultural background (see also Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 
2010; Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 
2016).
From an applied perspective, the results show that the 
optimal precision of one’s first offer depends on the 
opponent’s expertise. Note that we contrasted seasoned 
experts with less experienced amateurs. This does not 
imply that negotiation expertise is categorical; rather, it 
varies by degrees. Future research should examine when, 
in the process of becoming experts, people begin to den-
igrate the competence of a first mover who suggests too 
precise a price.
Although our findings support the attribution-of- 
competence account, scale-granularity processes may 
explain effects of precision in other settings. In social con-
texts such as negotiations, however, attribution of compe-
tence seems to trump scale granularity. We also believe 
that the inverted-U effect we observed among experts 
may not arise inevitably. This effect is likely dependent on 
the presence of a human counterpart to whom compe-
tence can be attributed (Zhang & Schwarz, 2013) and on 
a market environment in which round numbers are more 
prevalent than precise numbers ( Jansen & Pollmann, 
2001). For example, an inverted-U effect may not emerge 
in stock negotiations, in which highly precise numbers 
are the norm (Hukkanen & Keloharju, 2015).
Coda
Five experiments demonstrated that increasingly precise 
prices are increasingly potent anchors for amateurs. 
However, in negotiations with experts, moderately 
precise anchors are most effective. Experts react against 
too precise a price—unless a rationale that boosts the 
perceived competence of the first mover is provided.
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Notes
1. Results did not differ between anchors above and those 
below the baseline value (all ts < 0.92, ps > .36). Controlling for 
this factor in analyses of covariance did not change the pattern 
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or significance of any results in any of the experiments (all 
covariate Fs < 1.39, ps > .24). For simplicity, we followed prior 
research in collapsing across this factor (Mason et al., 2013).
2. For all experiments, additional robustness analyses (e.g., 
polynomial contrasts, analyses of variance, linear and quadratic 
regression analyses, and mediation analyses) are reported in 
the Supplemental Material. The reported degrees of freedom 
in the experiments are sometimes smaller than the total sample 
size because some subjects failed to respond to all dependent 
variables (i.e., missing values).
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